

Moultrie Independent Telephone Company Exhibit 1.0

OFFICIAL FILE

Direct Testimony

Of

Buz Wheeler

For Moultrie Independent Telephone Company

(ICC Consolidated Docket Nos. 00-0233 and 00-0335)

Q. Would you please state your name and business address?

A. My name is Buz Wheeler. My business address is 533 North Carson Street, Suite 4307, Carson City, NV 89706.

Q. In behalf of which company are you submitting this testimony?

A. This testimony is submitted in behalf of Moultrie Independent Telephone Company (Moultrie).

Q. What is your position with respect to Moultrie Independent Telephone Company?

A. I am the General Manager of Photonosys Systems, Inc., a telecommunications management think tank. As a consultant to Moultrie, I direct strategic planning and coordinate the preparation of cost analyses and related work for Moultrie for both state and federal regulatory proceedings.

Q. Have you prepared the Illinois Universal Service Funding calculations for Moultrie using the format agreed to by the Staff and the IITA?

32 A. Yes, in conjunction with Gridley Consulting Services, Inc. It is attached as
33 Moultrie Independent Telephone Company Exhibit 1.0, Schedule 1.01, and
34 consists of three pages.

35
36 Q. Would you please explain the process by which the Moultrie Independent
37 Telephone Company Exhibit 1.0, Schedule 1.01, was completed?

38 A. Moultrie Independent Telephone Company Exhibit 1.0, Schedule 1.01, was
39 completed in accordance with the instructions agreed upon by the IITA and ICC
40 staff. It is based on Moultrie's ICC Form 23A filed by the Company with the
41 Illinois Commerce Commission for the year ended December 31, 2000.

42
43 Q. Does page 1 of Moultrie Independent Telephone Company Exhibit 1.0, Schedule
44 1.01, contain any adjustments being proposed for Moultrie?

45 A. Yes, it does. An adjustment has been made to the Total Operating Revenues on
46 line 14. The adjustment reflects the Staff/IITA Standard Adjustment #3, related
47 to Out-of-Period Adjustments, and Standard Adjustment #5, related to Federal
48 Funding, as explained in Mr. Schoonmaker's Supplemental Direct Testimony in
49 IITA Exhibit 3, Attachment #3.

50
51 Q. Based on the responses and content of Moultrie Independent Telephone Company
52 Exhibit 1.0, Schedule 1.01, is Moultrie providing the Staff with certain additional
53 documents?

54 A. Yes. Staff will be provided with a copy of Moultrie Independent Telephone
55 Company's December 31, 2000, Trial Balance, as well as the documents pertinent
56 to Moultrie's affiliated interest transactions, under separate cover.

57
58 Q. Has Moultrie provided the requisite information from Moultrie Independent
59 Telephone Company Exhibit 1.0, Schedule 1.01, to Mr. Schoonmaker for his use
60 in compiling the composite results for all companies seeking funding in
61 connection with his testimony?

62 A. Yes, Moultrie has provided that information to Mr. Schoonmaker.

63
64 Q. Is Moultrie Independent Telephone Company Exhibit 1.0, Schedule 1.01, true and
65 correct to the best of your knowledge, information and belief?

66 A. Yes, it is.

67
68 Q. Would you please explain the adjustment in Moultrie's operating revenues?

69 A. Moultrie's adjustment reflects the exclusion of Federal support revenues withheld
70 by NECA. With respect to its business operations, Moultrie is a party in affiliated
71 interest transactions. Moultrie has refused to certify, under Title 18 USC, cost
72 studies prepared in accordance with FCC regulations that yield fictitious results.
73 Moultrie provided cost studies that accurately reflect the status of Moultrie's chart
74 of accounts and certified those studies. In 1997, after engaging in affiliated
75 interest transactions, Moultrie identified a disparity in the FCC's regulations, and
76 submitted accurate cost studies to NECA that correctly reflected Moultrie's chart

77 of accounts. NECA refused to accept Moultrie's studies, which ultimately
78 resulted in Moultrie filing a petition for declaratory ruling, asking the FCC to rule
79 on the application of the FCC's rules in these circumstances.

80 By way of background, Moultrie's management team, understanding the
81 evolution and operating environment of small rural ILECs, directed a corporate
82 reorganization in 1995, the purpose of which was to ensure a viable, healthy and
83 stable company to provide technologically advanced telecommunications services
84 to the residents of Lovington, Illinois, and the surrounding vicinity. Management
85 perceived that the best way to compete in the telecommunications market after the
86 passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act was to ensure that a reasonable
87 level of advanced technology be available to customers at a fair price, and, at the
88 same time, make the company operations as efficient as possible. By
89 reorganizing its business structures and segregating infrastructure, in accordance
90 with the FCC's then-current policy purporting to require separate subsidiaries for
91 nonregulated services, Moultrie positioned itself to reduce its operating costs and
92 capital structure while competing in a fair and equitable manner.

93
94 Q. Would you please explain the proceeding that is pending before the FCC?

95 A. Although Moultrie filed its petition in March of 1999, the FCC only placed the
96 petition on notice for public comment on February 1, 2001. NECA and two other
97 parties submitted comments and Moultrie replied to those comments. The FCC
98 has not yet ruled on Moultrie's petition. Consequently, Moultrie does not know
99 whether the FCC will direct NECA to accept Moultrie's studies as they are filed.

100 Therefore, Moultrie has included the lost Federal support amounts in its cost
101 report for purposes of this proceeding.

102 Moultrie and its consultants identified two disparities in the FCC's rules,
103 which are the crux of Moultrie's issue with NECA. The first disparity has to do
104 with the requirement which states that where a company leases facilities from an
105 affiliate, for purposes of the annual cost study it is required to submit to NECA, it
106 must essentially create a second chart of accounts, for use specifically in the
107 preparation of the cost study, in which it must back out any affiliated interest
108 lease expenses it has recorded in its operating chart of accounts, as if those
109 expenses never occurred. It must also record in the second chart of accounts the
110 net book value of the facilities leased from the affiliate. These requirements
111 create a substantially false and fictitious chart of accounts that does not accurately
112 represent the business activities of the regulated company. Any cost study
113 prepared for submission to NECA is required to be submitted with a federally
114 mandated certification that falls under Title 18 penalties. Attesting to the
115 accuracy of the data therein, when both the attester and the requiring agency
116 know the study is based on fraudulent data (18 USC §1346), results in the
117 requiring agency eliciting a false official statement, and results in the attester
118 committing what is tantamount to perjury (18 USC §1621). Moultrie has made
119 clear, to both NECA and the FCC, its objections to such certification under these
120 circumstances.

121 The second disparity Moultrie identified is pertinent to the cost study
122 treatment of leased facilities. Moultrie has found no law or regulation requiring

an ILEC to own the facilities it uses in the provision of its services. That being the case, the Part 36 separations rules have no basis in law to allow discrimination against an ILEC that leases from an affiliate. Regardless of whether the facilities a carrier leases are owned by an affiliate or a disinterested third party, the effects on the universal service pool should be transparent. Under NECA's treatment of the referenced transaction, they obviously are not. Moultrie has argued to the FCC that its rules are flawed as they discriminate against carriers that do not own their own facilities and defeat the intent of Congress as prescribed in the 1934 Communications Act and the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Furthermore, Parts 32 and 36 of the FCC's rules clearly contradict each other as one part of the rules allows a carrier to sell assets to an affiliate, while the other requires the carrier to account for the transaction as if it never occurred. Therefore, the FCC exceeded its authority by expanding the scope of the 1934 and 1996 Telecommunications Acts by promulgating regulations that have no basis in law. As stated above, Moultrie is awaiting the FCC's decision on this petition.

Q. Does Moultrie support the establishment of a Universal Service Fund in Illinois?

A. Yes, Moultrie agrees with the IITA that an Illinois Universal Service Fund is warranted. Universal Service is a complicated issue. One purpose of Universal Service is to maintain reasonably priced services for, and access to those services by, telephone customers living in high cost, low-density areas. This was accomplished initially by establishing an environment that fostered low local rates and high long distance rates. All retail rates were artificially set and controlled by

146 either intrastate or interstate regulation. Then, as a result of artificial pricing and
147 (minimal) competition in the local market, and robust competition in the long
148 distance market, the ratio between local revenues and long distance revenues
149 changed significantly. In short, a critical part of local operations funding had
150 been buried in long distance rates, with access charges acting as an implicit
151 subsidy mechanism. For the most part, with high interstate access rates, cost
152 recovery for local operations was accommodated reasonably well without high
153 local service prices.

154 With artificially low mandated profit rates, it has become extremely
155 difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a financially viable small rural telephone
156 company in the current environment. Competition has begun to enter rural
157 markets. There is an edict to allow these competitors access to unbundled local
158 loops and switches at a cost based upon the artificial retail pricing to end users,
159 followed by an edict that transfers the high cost subsidy for those artificially low-
160 priced loops to the competitors. A competitor has no appreciable investment risk,
161 no operating capital tied up in infrastructure, and no appreciable regulatory costs.
162 Also, a competitor has no long-term commitment to customers; if its business
163 doesn't work out, it is able to wash its hands of the whole deal and walk away,
164 especially if the customer point of contact is an "800" number in another town or
165 state. This leaves the small rural independent local exchange carrier "holding the
166 bag." Not only is the incumbent at risk of losing customers to competitors, but
167 also, the incumbent is "required" to take those customers back at whatever cost, if
168 the competitive local exchange carrier's experiment fails. In the meantime, the

169 incumbent carrier is forced to maintain the local infrastructure for use by
170 competitors.

171 Moultrie cannot conceive that it was, nor is, the intent of Congress to put
172 small rural ILECs out of business. While customer base and revenue resources
173 are drained by competition, the operations and maintenance costs and the general
174 and administrative costs of a small company remain essentially unchanged.
175 Further, Regional Bell Operating Companies, under price cap regulation, enjoy a
176 much more reasonable profit margin (we estimate in the range of 19% to 23% for
177 the regulated entity) and significantly better system density and customer density.
178 The favorable economies of scope and scale that are derived from their large-scale
179 operations are generally not enjoyed by small rural ILECs. In an environment
180 where technology now evolves about once every twenty months, facilities and
181 equipment become obsolete before the ends of their useful lives. This creates the
182 risk that a small rural ILEC will go out of business in about three evolutions (five
183 years), or, it will become so susceptible to competition because of its limited
184 capabilities that new telecommunications providers will erode its customer base to
185 the point that its financial viability approaches bankruptcy.

186 Add to this scenario the myriad of problems inherent in dealing with
187 elected legislators, appointed agency officials and regulatory staffs, all of who
188 tend in practice to operate from a cost center perspective and not a profit center
189 perspective. Regulation adds considerably to the operating costs of private
190 business. The cost of regulation drives up the cost of all services. Although a
191 government agency that runs short of cash may operate on deficit spending,

192 deficit spending as a method of operating a business enterprise is risky and can
193 quickly lead to bankruptcy. Regulation also creates the need for cost consultants
194 and attorneys whom the company must pay to deal with this regulatory scenario.
195 A disproportionate cost of regulation is inflicted on small companies that are less
196 able to absorb the added costs or, as a result of regulatory practices, to pass those
197 costs on to its end user customers.

198 The small rural ILEC today is in a position similar to that of the California
199 power companies that have recently been in the news. The retail side of the
200 business, represented by the ILEC class of companies, is heavily regulated while
201 the wholesale side, represented by competitive LECs and interexchange carriers,
202 is unregulated. In addition, small rural ILECs find it extremely difficult to
203 compete because of the inherent high costs associated with maintaining a small
204 business that was neither designed nor envisioned to provide wholesale services
205 (the leasing of lines and/or switching to competitors). Consequently,
206 technological parity is extremely difficult and expensive to achieve and maintain,
207 and a technological advantage is impossible to attain, because whatever
208 technology is injected into the local infrastructure is forced through regulatory
209 requirements to be provided at a wholesale price to whatever competitor emerges.
210 The rural ILEC is open to competition regardless of whether there is system
211 density or customer density to support a competitive environment.

212 The ICC could alleviate some of the economic stress on rural ILECs by
213 forming a universal service fund that allows for full recovery of the ILECs' costs
214 of providing service in the current competitive environment. As explained above,

215 Moultrie has structured its company in a way to provide quality services to its
216 rural customers and to compete on an equal footing with its competitors. An
217 Illinois fund to ensure full recovery of rural ILECs' costs of providing service is
218 in the public interest.

219

220 Q. Does that conclude your Direct Testimony in behalf of Moultrie Independent
221 Telephone Company?

222 A. Yes, it does. Thank you for allowing Moultrie to provide its views.

223

Moultrie Independent Telephone Company
Illinois Universal Service Funding Calculation
 Based upon ICC Form 23A Report Data for December 31, 2000

<u>Line#</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Adjustment</u>	<u>Adjusted Amount</u>
1	Net Regulated Plant	Form 23A, P 8, Net Plant	\$ 465,723	\$ -	\$ 465,723
2	Materials and Supplies Inventory	Page 2, 13-Month Average	59,992		59,992
3	Customer Deposits	Form 23A, P 8, 4040	-	-	-
4	ADIT - Regulated Plant	Form 23A, P 8, 4100 + 4340	(84,339)	-	(84,339)
5	Rate Base before Working Capital	line 1 + line 2 - line 3 - line 4			610,054
6	Working Capital Requirement				
7	Total Operating Expenses	Form 23A, P 14, Total	1,731,452	-	1,731,452
8	Less: Depreciation Expense	Form 23A, P 13, 6560	175,221	-	175,221
9	Total WC Operating Expense	line 7 - line 8	1,556,231	-	1,556,231
10	WC OE Requirement	line 9 * 45 / 360			194,529
11	Commission-Ordered Cash Balance Requirement		-	-	-
12	Total Working Capital Requirement	line 10 + line 11			194,529
13	Total Rate Base	line 5 + line 12			804,583
14	Total Operating Revenues	Form 23A, P 11, Total	1,899,191	(233,290)	1,665,901
15	Less: Illinois High Cost Fund		513,300	-	513,300
16	Net Operating Revenues	line 14 - line 15	1,385,891	(233,290)	1,152,601
17	Total Operating Expenses	Form 23A, P 14, Total	1,731,452	-	1,731,452
18	Other Operating Inc and Exp - Net	Form 23A, P 15, 7100	-	-	-
19	Other Operating Taxes	Form 23A, P 15, 7240	1,570	-	1,570
20	Net Op Inc before Income Taxes	line 16 - lines 17, 18, & 19	(347,131)	(233,290)	(580,421)
21	Income Tax Expense	line 34			(224,848)
22	Net Operating Income	line 20 - line 21			(355,573)
23	Return on Rate Base	line 22 / line 13			-44.19%
24	After-tax Cost of Capital				11.21%
25	Target Net Operating Income	line 24 * line 13			90,194
26	Adj to Achieve Target Return on RB	line 25 - line 22			445,767
27	Gross Revenue Conversion Factor	line 35			1.6324
28	ROR Funding Deficiency Including Inc Taxes	line 26 * line 27			727,670
29	Calculation of Income Tax Expense				
30	Net Op Inc before Inc Taxes	line 20			(580,421)
31	Illinois Inc & Rep Tax Expense	line 30 * 7.18%			(41,674)
32	Net Op Inc before Fed Inc Tax	line 30 - line 31			(538,747)
33	Federal Income Tax Expense	line 32 * 34.00%			(183,174)
34	Total Imputed Income Tax Expense	line 31 + line 33			(224,848)
35	Gross Revenue Conversion Factor	1 / ((1 - .0718) * (1 - .34))			1.6324

Note for Staff: Neither of the two choices in either the "Sale/Lease Back Arrangement" or the "Lease Agreement With Affiliates" sections above were crafted in a manner concise enough for purposes of testimony and/or supporting documentation to afford Moultrie the opportunity to provide precisely accurate responses by selecting any of the options. In other words, Moultrie believes these declarations, if assented to as written, could potentially be proved to be false upon cross examination. Further, Moultrie's investigation into the course of events leading up to the inclusion of these sections in the Schedule 1.01 yielded that staff and the "Schedule 1.01 Negotiating Committee" of the IITA apparently agreed upon the text of the options without the benefit of review and approval by IITA's counsel, or any IITA member's counsel, such that assurances could be made to individual IITA member companies that the verbiage in at least one of the options in each section accurately described the circumstances of each member.

In point of fact, Moultrie believes it does not now have a sale/lease back "arrangement." However, for the duration of the 1/1/97-12/31/98 time period, it may reasonably be construed that Moultrie did have a sale/lease back "arrangement," depending upon the definition to be attributed to "arrangement." Moultrie was not willing to commit to the first option due to the potential inference that it might be attempting to mislead staff. Two contracts were previously submitted under separate cover which document that "arrangement." Moultrie InfoComm, the lessor for that two year period, has subsequently sold the assets to another of its affiliates, 111 Internet Services, Inc., from which Moultrie is now leasing facilities under the same general terms and conditions as in the previous lease. The lease contract covering that agreement is provided herewith in its unsigned e-document form as an additional attachment. An executed hardcopy version will be provided under separate cover.

Moultrie Independent Telephone Company
Illinois Universal Service Funding Calculation
Based upon ICC Form 23A Report Data for December 31, 2000
Material & Supplies Worksheet and Other Information

Line #

1	December-99	\$60,904
2	January-00	\$60,920
3	February-00	\$60,919
4	March-00	\$60,743
5	April-00	\$60,813
6	May-00	\$60,287
7	June-00	\$60,284
8	July-00	\$60,216
9	August-00	\$59,096
10	September-00	\$58,886
11	October-00	\$58,876
12	November-00	\$58,755
13	December-00	\$59,202
14	13 Month Average	\$59,992

Sale/Lease Back Arrangement

- ☐ The company does not have any sale(s)/lease back arrangement.
☐ The company does have sale(s)/lease back arrangement and has provided additional information to staff.

Lease Agreement with Affiliates

- ☐ The company does not have any lease agreements with affiliates.
☐ The company does have lease agreements with affiliates and has provided additional information to staff.

Trial Balances

The Company has provided a copy of its 12/31/2000 trial balance in support of the attached exhibits.

(Note for Staff: Contained on next page)

Moultrie Independent Telephone Company
 Illinois Universal Service Funding Calculation
 Based upon ICC Form 23A Report Data for December 31, 2000
 Operating Revenues By Category

<u>Line #</u>		<u>Source</u>	<u>Amount</u>
		Form 23A, P 10, Total Local	
1	Local Revenues	Network Service Revenues	\$ 124,689
2	State Subscriber Line Charges	Trial Balance 12/31/00	\$ 98,711
3	State Access Revenues	Trial Balance 12/31/00	\$ 418,610
4	State High Cost Support	Exhibit X, Line 15	\$ 513,300
5	State Special Access Revenues	Trial Balance 12/31/00	\$ 22,552
6	Total State Access & Local Revenues	Sum (Ln 1 - 5)	\$ 1,177,862
7	Federal Subscriber Lines Charges	Trial Balance 12/31/00	\$ 39,116
8	Federal Access Revenues	Trial Balance 12/31/00	\$ 246,853
9	Federal High Cost Support	Trial Balance 12/31/00	\$ 312,592
10	Federal Special Access Revenues	Trial Balance 12/31/00	\$ 107,678
11	Total Federal Access Revenues	Sum (Ln 7 - 10)	\$ 706,239
12	Misc Revenues	Trial Balance 12/31/00	\$ 15,090
13	Total Operating Revenues	Ln 6 + Ln 11 + Ln 12	<u>\$ 1,899,191</u>